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 The first part of this essay explores features and factors pertaining to democratic ideas, ideals and 
procedures in general and the limits of their applicability in the Arab world in particular. The second 
part assesses the persistence of the U.S. credibility problem in the Arab world, which became more 
evident after the George W. Bush Administration began advancing its democracy promotion plans for 
the "Greater Middle East" region. Although it remained largely symbolic, the Administration’s focus on 
democratization has, directly or indirectly, played a contributory role in strengthening the status of 
autocratic Arab regimes that support U.S. policy and interests, while hindering the stability of regimes 
that remain opposed to the U.S. and its allies in the region. In general, the article aims at examining 
factors and events that have contributed to the deleterious effects of U.S. policy on democratization in 
the Arab world. More specifically, it argues that the Bush Administration’s rhetoric on democracy 
promotion, which strengthened the status of pro-U.S. regimes in the Arab world, has also contributed 
to empowering Islamists' popular appeal along with hampering the U.S.'s credibility, public image and 
prestige across the region. 
 





A majority of Arab incumbent elites, supported by the U.S., have, for decades, utilized 
their traditional sources of power and charisma as a means to manipulate their subjects and 
preserve the political stability of their societies. While depending on strong military 
institutions, Arab incumbents have also utilized their established rules and procedures as a 
means to exploit public fear, co-opt moderate opponents and repress dissidents in their 
respective countries. In response to growing local and international pressures for democratic 
reform, notably in the post-September 11th era, a number of Arab regimes, influenced by the 
Bush Administration, began conducting minor political and economic changes, which in the 
end did little to modernize their entrenched autocratic politics. Although some encouraging 
liberalizing changes have been introduced, mainly in non-Arab countries in the Islamic world, 
incumbent Arab regimes remained, for the most part, neither interested nor able to 
consolidate thriving political and economic reforms that would commit them to the ideals 
and procedures of democracy, including, among others, the acceptance of the rule of law, 
political inclusion, along with accountability and transparency in governance. Unlike most 
Arab incumbent elites, however, the Arab and Muslim masses across the region have 
regularly expressed interest in genuine and comprehensive reforms that would empower and 
entice them to play a part in the conduct of public policies of their societies. (Balqzeez 2000: 
135-153). 
Although U.S. policymakers have traditionally expressed little or no interest in 
democratizing Middle Eastern states in general and Arab countries in particular, the Bush 
Administration began, in November 2003, pursuing steps for promoting democracy in what 
it called the “Greater Middle East,” which includes additional Islamic countries such as 




Afghanistan and Pakistan. Apart from the Administration's real intent that may lay behind its 
democratization efforts, the worsening of the security situation in Iraq, the increased popular 
appeal of Islamists across the region and the rising criticism of the U.S. approach to the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts have eventually enticed Bush’s advisors to abandon the 
democracy promotion agenda in favor of shoring up the status of Arab autocratic regimes 
that continue to serve the goals and interests of the U.S. in the region. (Gershkoff and 
Kushner 2005: 525-536). Undoubtedly, the Bush Administration's unprecedented degree of 
identification with Israel’s interests at the expense of others in the region has further limited 
the ability of the U.S. to positively influence or transform rising anti-American sentiment in 
the Arab streets. Ironically, while backing the autocratic Arab regimes at the official level, 
the Administration continued to provide the same lip service support for its plans to 
democratize Iraq and the larger region. Given this situation and despite criticisms from its 
foes and allies, the Administration has supported the parliamentary elections held in Iraq, 
Egypt and the Palestinian territories. At the same time, however, Bush’s advisers did not 
expect that such support would in the end empower Hamas in Palestine, the Muslim Brothers 
in Egypt and the Shi’a factions in Iraq.  
The persistence of authoritarian politics in the Arab world has been mainly attributed to 
economic, social and political factors that are largely shaped by the type of policies and form 
of governance practiced by Arab autocratic leaders and institutions. Apart from these internal 
causes, other factors, mainly external, including past European colonial legacies in the Arab 
world and the U.S.’s current intervention in the region, may have also, to a large degree, 
contributed to the strength of authoritarian politics and widespread corruption in the Arab 
world (Labeeb 2000: 199-231). For example, the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) incompetence 
to govern or deliver services to its citizens, which has largely been caused by the 
continuation of Israel’s military occupation of the Palestinian territories, has contributed to 
the spread of corruption associated with the PA leadership and institutions. Furthermore, the 
deteriorating security and political situations in Iraq, which is attributed to the failure of the 
U.S.’s mission in the country and the continuation of its military intervention, has also 
contributed to the reviving of deeply rooted sectarian feuds among and between Iraqis. In 
other settings in the larger Islamic world, however, instead of pursuing democratization, the 
Bush Administration found it far more convenient to eagerly cooperate with and support 
autocratic regimes, such as in the case of its backing for Perviz Musharaf's regime in 
Pakistan. Across the Arab world, the Bush Administration’s democratization efforts have 
been mainly inhibited by the rising appeal of puritan Islamists, along with the rise of a new 
generation of Islamist extremists, groups that ultimately benefited from the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq (Gerges 2005). 
While recognizing widespread differences regarding the precise circumstances that may 
exist in each setting in the Arab world and understanding the different causes that may have 
hindered democracy promotion in these settings, a combination of internal and external 
factors appear to have been largely responsible for the persistence of authoritarianism in the 
region. Domestic factors such as political, economic and social challenges across the Arab 
world have played the most significant role in hindering democracy promotion efforts. 
Having supported and protected the status of its Arab autocratic allies in the region, the U.S. 
also, directly or indirectly, contributed to the persistence of authoritarian politics in the 
region. Over the course of their history, pro-U.S. autocratic regimes in the Arab world have 
managed, often in the name of challenging Islamist extremists or, more recently, in the name 
of the war on terror, to strengthen and maintain their unchallenged dominance in their own 




countries. Although the continued strength of authoritarian politics across the Arab world 
and the failure of the Palestinian-Israeli peace efforts have existed long before the Bush 
Administration came into office, Bush’s failure to play a decisive and positive role in Iraq 
and/or with regard to his democratization efforts have essentially undermined the U.S.’s 
credibility and prestige. Although the reasons for the Administration’s failure to accomplish 
its plans for the region are diverse, the heavy reliance of most U.S. policymakers on 
established frames of references and misperceptions about the region and its people may 
have produced misguided recommendations for the Arab world. 
Consequently, any real efforts intended by U.S. policymakers to overcome the present 
challenges facing their policies across the region, with respect to, among others, the Iraq 
situation, the Palestine issue, the war on terror and democracy promotion, should begin, first 
and foremost, with intense reviews and questioning of the approaches, policy 
recommendations and conducts of U.S. policymakers towards the Arab regimes and Israel on 
the one hand and the Arab and Muslim public on the other. Without re-examining the U.S.'s 
cultural orientations and policy choices that have always sided with Israel at all costs, the 
deep mistrust that the Arab and Muslim masses hold toward the U.S. and the West will likely 
continue to exist and therefore, hinder the successful pursuit of the U.S.’s goals in the region. 
Given the heightening of its present credibility problem, the U.S.’s ability to influence the 
Arab public or to democratize the region will continue to fail. Whether or not the lack of a 
solution for the Palestine issue and the deterioration of Iraq’s security status, which have not 
contributed to a stable setting conducive to democratization, should be viewed as crucial in 
explaining the strength of anti-Americanism and the persistence of Arab autocracies, remains 
to be seen. Undoubtedly though, Arab regimes have over the years managed to play a 
complicit role in undermining democracy in their societies. (Abdallah 2000: 311-324). 
 
 
2. INCUMBENT REGIMES AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
 
In reference to the “Third Wave” of democratization that took place in Southern Europe, 
Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, Richard Hass viewed attempted 
reforms in various Arab and non-Arab countries in the Islamic world as signs of a “fourth 
wave” of democracy promotion (Hass 2003: 138). As mentioned earlier, although the recent 
elections that took place in Iraq, Egypt and the PA have all led to the success of Islamists, 
who might be hesitant to support ideological and political diversities in their societies, the 
election events themselves have been cited as signs supporting democratization in the region. 
Although successes were made in these elections at the procedural level, the application of 
essential democratic ideals and values has, however, been non-existent in the larger Arab 
world. While exploring different experiences with democratization worldwide, Professors 
Diamond, Linz, and Lipset have singled out three factors as vital for the success of 
democracy promotion in most, if not all, developing countries, including the Arab world: 
 
“(1) Meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups…for all 
effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force. (2) 
A highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at 
least through regular and fair election…(3) A level of civil and political liberties…to ensure the 
integrity of political competition and participation.” (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1988: p.xvi; 
Schlumberger 2002: 107) 




These features reveal, among other things, the depth of difficulties surrounding 
democracy building efforts in Arab politics, where existing incumbent regimes' main concern 
remains centered on preserving their governing status over society (Hijab 1992: 69-85). Past 
European colonial legacies, along with the more recent U.S. interventions in the region, have 
also hindered the success of democratization efforts in the Arab world. The U.S.’s backing of 
autocratic Arab regimes and the deepening of its involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan has 
further added to the existing challenges facing its efforts to reforms in the region. Although 
initially treated as welcome news, the deposing of Saddam Hussein was eventually viewed as 
having failed to bring the Iraqis and surrounding countries any closer to democracy. As a 
skillful tyrant and aware of the details of his authoritarian legacy, Saddam stated in 2003 that 
while the U.S. “may get rid of me as president … [it] will need seven presidents to hold this 
country [Iraq] down.” (Halliday 2005: 219). While pointing to detrimental threats stemming 
from outside interventions and to domestic limits on transforming Iraq, Saddam’s view 
reveals the extent to which Arab institutions remain subjected to a one-man’s legacy in 
governance. Similar to Iraq, the surrounding countries, notably Syria, the strength and 
continued legacy of al-Assad’s dynastic regime, have, often in the name of challenging the 
U.S. and Israel, placed the Syrians under the strict and unquestionable control of the regime.  
Whether self-motivated or externally imposed, democratization in most settings, 
including the Arab world, entails, among other things, the creation of political institutions 
and procedures that are based on the rule of law, popular sovereignty, political inclusion and 
expansive commitments to liberal ideals that should in the end be able to establish equal 
treatment under the law along with ensuring the presence of meaningful citizens' 
participation in public policies (Zeedani 1990: 4-21). Despite vast variations in human's 
understandings and/or applications of democracies worldwide, countries experiencing 
various types of democratic transitions are expected to pursue and achieve most, if not all, of 
the following deep-seated features, procedures and values that identify most modern 
democracies: (1) self-governing and popularly elected authorities based on free, fair and 
competitive elections; (2) protection of, and respect for, human and individual rights and 
liberties; (3) embracing of fairness, tolerance and hospitality towards disadvantaged groups 
(Marty 2005); (4) existence of independent judiciaries and presence of oversight procedures 
between legislative and executive powers; (5)  elimination of all forms of political 
persecutions; (6) safeguarding of freedoms of expression, religion, press and association; (7) 
legal protection for political groups and parties; (8) effective de-politicization of military 
institutions; (9) a pursuit of peaceful resolutions to local, regional and global conflicts; and 
(10) citizen's ability to oust their leaders peacefully and through the use of ballot boxes (Dahl 
1971; Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1988; Sartori 1995: 101-111). 
Although the above rules, procedures and ideals are almost non-existent in Arab politics, 
efforts to democratize countries in the Arab and Islamic world have resulted in inconsistent 
outcomes. While most studies on Arab politics have indeed pointed to widespread deficits in 
democracy and freedoms, successes in democratization and market-oriented liberalization 
can be mainly found in non-Arab Islamic countries, notably Turkey and Indonesia (Zambelis 
2005: 90). Turkey’s progress in the area of economic liberalization has not been 
accompanied with necessary and sufficient degrees of political and social reforms due to, in 
part, Attaturk’s established legacy along with the influential political role of the Turkish 
military in the governing of the country. On the other hand, in most Arab countries that have 
experienced certain aspects of modernization, namely in the area of economic reform, such 
as Egypt, Jordan, Tunis and Morocco, among others, it appears that the incumbent regimes of 




these and other similar countries have continually utilized, for different reasons at different 
times in their histories, the subject of democratization as a general tool and tactic of "political 
survival and one element in a type of regime that combines guided pluralism, controlled 
elections, and selective repression.” (Diamond 2005: 17; Brumberg 2002: 56). While 
exploring conflicting outcomes of reforms in many settings in the region, Fred Halliday 
concluded: 
 
“In some societies, a degree of limited freedom of expression and publication has been 
permitted, and in others the level of incarceration, torture and forced exile has declined…But 
on two other fronts, the balance has been different. First, none of the four core conditions of 
democratic order have applied: publicly available, accurate figures for state finances, income 
and expenditure; institutionalized and legally protected independent political parties; the ability 
of the electorate to vote out those with real power; full freedom of the press and information 
within the legal limits set by international law. Secondly, while control by governments has 
continued … the political programs and political culture of many of the opposition forces have 
themselves become increasingly undemocratic, dominated by programs of religious and 
confessional authoritarianism.” (Halliday 2005: 80)  
 
As stated before, while Turkey, Indonesia and Bangladesh have experienced marginal 
successes in their democracy promotion efforts (Avineri 2002: 21-25), Pakistan has managed 
to join the Arab world in signaling the emergence of “a reverse wave” of democracy 
breakdown. (Diamond 2005: 14). Perviz Musharaf, supported by the Bush Administration, is 
now in the process of utilizing legal procedures as a means to legitimate his power and 
participate in the upcoming presidential election.  
The failure of democracy promotion efforts in the Arab world has been documented in 
the U.N. Annual Human Development reports. Although the detail of governance in the Arab 
world remains a taboo, such reports namely highlight namely the internal challenges that 
continue to obstruct democracy-building efforts in Arab politics. These challenges are 
exemplified in the continuous presence of various trends of authoritarian regimes, notably 
personal dictatorships, dynastic and military regimes across the Arab world; the lack of 
oversight, transparency and accountability in Arab political institutions; the widespread 
violations of human rights and individual liberties; unchecked power of all executive 
authorities; the dominance of military institutions and secret police over civic and political 
institutions in a number of settings; and a widespread discriminations against disadvantaged 
groups, notably women and ethnic minorities. Although these obstacles may indeed, 
according to the U.N. report, constitute convincing explanations of the lack of democracy in 
the Arab world, the U.N. reports, although accurate, have “omitted the historical and 
international context in which these societies have been shaped”. The main external factor 
that should have been included in a sequence of U.N. reports is about the Arab world's 
continued “subjugation to the West,” which, among other things, has contributed in the 
“creation of authoritarian states and rentier economies” across the region (Halliday 2005: 78; 
UN Human Development Reports 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005). As stated before, the U.S.’s 
backing of Arab autocratic regimes along with its continued support for Israel, have, among 
other things, fueled public anger and justified Arab incumbents' rejection of democracy 
(Richards 2005: 28-35). 
While trying to evade pressure for reform, Arab incumbents have utilized nationalist, 
ethnic and sectarian divisions in their own societies and have engaged their masses in 




domestic feuds while ensuring the continued dominance of their existing authorities. Arab 
incumbents were also able to overcome their inability to establish good governance by 
utilizing selective forms of tolerance towards certain opponents while enforcing animosity 
towards other groups in their societies. By diverting attention from the so-called “others” in 
their societies, such as the targeting of the Kurds under Saddam’s regime in Iraq or the non-
Arab groups in Sudan, Arab incumbents have, in effect, preserved their own repressive 
regimes. To avoid potential and future threats to their power, Arab regimes have regularly 
formulated alliances with moderate opponents, such as in the cases of Egypt’s and Morocco's 
moderate Islamists. In other occasions, however, some of these same regimes tried to 
exterminate Islamic Jihad, such as in the case of the Egyptian regime's conflict with the 
Islamic Jihad group during much of the 1980s. While the successes of their different 
strategies are never certain, most Arab incumbents have thus far been able to balance their 
own moderate opponents against the extremist forces in their own societies. Incumbents’ 
ability to construct such complex “exclusive and inclusive” forms and structures of 
governance within their societies has provided them with the means to minimize the effects 
of other domestic threats and generate all needed public support for their regimes, even at 
times of economic crises. (Lust-Okar 2005; Mohamad 2006: 329-331).
 
In so doing, 
incumbent regimes across the Arab world were able to uphold power and avert any serious 
pressures for democracy promotion in their societies. 
The skillful ability of Arab incumbents to continue to govern at times of prolonged 
economic and political crises in their societies has puzzled experts and observers alike. In 
reflecting on the persistence of authoritarianism, a number of experts drew attention to what 
they considered culturally grounded factors that explain the longevity of autocratic rules in 
Arab politics. They, for example, cited the religion and cultures of Islam as being 
fundamentally incompatible with democracy promotion, especially when dealing with 
Islamists in the post-September 11th era. Against such culturally oriented views that became 
popular in recent years, however, others believe that the depiction of Arabs and Muslims as 
being almost naturally hostile to democratic values is not only providing misperceived and 
generalized information, but is also flawed and inaccurate. Claims about inherent 
incompatibilities between Islam and democracy have been heavily grounded in contributions 
made by S. Huntington and Bernard Lewis who have utilized their scholarship on the clash 
of civilizations thesis as a tool to explain what they saw as endless cultural wars between the 
West and the Muslim world (Huntington 1993: 22-49; Lewis, 2002).
 
A majority of experts 
and observers, however, such as Richard Bulliet, John Esposito, Ali Mazrui, and Khalid 
Abou el-Fadl, to mention a few, presented opposing arguments that back the compatibility 
between Islam, democracy and the West. (Bulliet 2004). In the conclusions of normative as 
well as empirical research, it has also been assumed that the majority of “Muslims are as 
supportive of democracy as non-Muslims.” (Diamond 2005: 17). 
Given the rising role of religious activism in society and the politicization of religions 
worldwide, including Islamists in the Arab world, (Gerges 2005), Protestant Evangelicals in 
the U.S. and Britain, (Anderson 2006) Jewish fanatics in Israel (Shahak and Mezvinsky 
2004), and Hindu nationalists in India (Juergensmeyer 2000), the singling out of Islam as the 
only religion conflicting with democracy is misleading. With the exception of global Islamist 
extremists that advocate indiscriminate violence in what they see as an unending conflict 
with the U.S. and the West, (Gerges 2005), the majority of Muslims, unlike European 
Christians, were not hospitable to totalitarian ideologies with the magnitude of Nazism, 
Fascism and Stalinism. (Mazrui 1997: 118-132). Unlike puritan Islamists who are likely to 




resent democracy, moderate Muslims believe that Islam has offered them procedures and 
values consistent with the fundamentals of modern democracy. They often point to Islamic 
teachings that emphasize, among other values and procedures, the need to establish a strong 
and interactive relationship between the Islamic Umma and Dawla (community and state).  
Although Muslims worldwide view their Shari’a (law) as being eternally valid and 
comprehensive, they also argue that the presence of religious procedures in the Shari'a such 
as al-Shura (consultation); al-Ijtihad (intellectual jurisprudence); al-Tasamuh (tolerance); 
and al-Ijma’ (consensus) are valuable tools that have largely maintained the historical 
integrity and relevance of Islamic laws to cope with the changing circumstances influencing 
their societies and living conditions. (Mohamad 2000: 567-577). Islam’s compatibility with 
democratic procedures, however, has been challenged by facts on the ground, such as those 
revealing that out “of the 47 Muslim majority countries in the world, only nine are 
democracies … such as Indonesia, Turkey and Bangladesh.” However, other Muslim 
communities have been thriving under democratic systems, i.e., India’s one hundred million 
Muslims, (Diamond 2005: 16), as well as in the U.S. and Europe. The existing cultural 
factors cannot thus, and should not, be used as an essential factor that could on its own 
explain the persistence of despotism in the Arab and Islamic world. The absence of Arab 
democracy could be better attributed to the deeply rooted non-cultural based internal and 
external obstacles, such as the widespread failure and corruption along with the effects of 
colonialism, that have confronted the region in the past century. 
 
 
3. U.S. CREDIBILITY PROBLEMS AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
 
The U.S.’s interventions in Iraq, the lack of a peaceful resolution for the Palestine issue 
and the U.S.’s backing of autocratic Arab regimes are among the factors that have, directly or 
indirectly, stalled democratization and hindered the credibility and reputation of the U.S. 
across the region. (Hassouna 2001: 50; Mohamad 2007: 85-94). The U.S. has been 
historically shielding autocratic Arab regimes in the name of enforcing regional stability. For 
this reason, Arab incumbent regimes have steadily argued against the promotion of 
democracy on the grounds that it would likely endanger the stability of their societies and 
allow Islamists to capture power through the use of ballot boxes. Arab autocratic regimes 
have also been successful in portraying liberal reformers in their countries “as agents not of 
positive change but of foreign occupation.” (Lust-Okar 2004: 3-5). 
Current U.S. Plans for reforming the greater Middle East, which came as part of a grand 
security strategy introduced in the post-September 11th period, were launched, along with 
other initiatives, including the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, the Middle 
East Partnership Initiative and the Middle East Free Trade Area, with the intention of 
spreading democracy and liberalization throughout the region. Over the years, many Arab 
countries were encouraged, through financial incentives such as those often offered by the 
USAID, to begin pursuing democratization and free market oriented policies. After receiving 
financial aid, these and other similar regimes have managed to formulate varying degrees of 
economic liberalization, while, at the same time, have continued to resist political 
democratization. For example, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and Tunisia, who have all received U.S. 
financial assistance, continued to impose ample restrictions on freedoms and liberties in their 
own societies. Their economic reforms have, in fact, served the incumbents in these countries 
as a means to avert pressure for political and social reforms along with distracting 




surrounding “attention from the political arena” and disguise human rights violations in their 
settings. (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004: 385). Despite receiving $1.9 billion annually in 
U.S. aid, the Egyptian regime has also managed over the years to silence its opponents and 
critics with imprisonment, such as in its jailing of political activists and scholars, notably 
Ayman Nour who opposed President Mubarak, and Saad Eddin Ibrahim whose writings were 
critical of Mubarak's regime. The latest elections in Egypt, which empowered the Muslim 
brotherhood movement, were also utilized by Mubarak's regime to pressure the Bush 
Administration into halting its political democratization plans that may have benefited 
Islamists. 
To a large degree, it is often assumed that the Bush Administration’s democracy 
promotion plans for the larger Middle East have been influenced by idealistic traditions 
found in the early phases of U.S. foreign policy that are rooted, among others, in 
Wilsonianism and modernization theories aimed at addressing problems and challenges 
facing newly independent countries around the world. Although prominent political realist 
scholars and practitioners have openly criticized Bush’s grand security strategy with regard 
to the Iraq war and his democratization efforts, (Mersheimer and Walt
 
 2006: 1-32), the 
Administration’s approach and conduct in foreign policymaking remained focused on the 
protection of traditional U.S. nationalist goals, i.e., to stabilize the region and secure the flow 
of oil to the West, through the potential use of force and/or diplomacy. The Bush 
Administration’s idealist rhetoric on democracy promotion, following the Iraq war, has been 
particularly influenced by the failure of the U.S. to find the weapons of mass destruction 
used to legitimize the launching of the war itself, which enticed the Administration into re-
inventing the reasons for its invasion of Iraq. Faced with this situation, the new strategy of 
the administration became thus focused, at least in rhetoric, towards democratizing Iraq and 
the greater Middle East.  
Given existing uncertainties that may be attributed to democracy building efforts in the 
Middle East and the risks to political stability in the region, notably after violence in Iraq had 
intensified, most U.S. politicians, including some in the Bush Administration, found it more 
convenient to begin shifting the White House's security strategy from being centered on 
democracy promotion to backing the same traditional autocratic allied regimes in the Arab 
and Islamic world. At the same time, however, many of the neo-conservative trends in the 
Bush Administration continued to openly question the U.S.’s past alliances with, and support 
for, autocratic Arab regimes, which after the failure of the U.S.’s mission in Iraq, were 
subject to intellectual and public criticisms. (Mersheimer and Walt
 
 2006: 1-32; Fuckuyama 
2006) In rhetoric, however, and in response to the concerns of the neo-conservatives, the 
Bush Administration continued to suggest that its democratization plans for the region 
remained on track and that they would eventually succeed and bring about the formation of 
new liberalizing economies as well as legitimate and democratically elected governments 
with strong ties with the U.S. and the West. (Aliboni and Guazzone 2004: 82-93). 
In the end, the Bush Administration’s democracy promotion initiatives have resulted in 
mixed outcomes that have ranged from general failure, such as in the case of Iraq, to minor 
successes that have enticed local reforms in countries such as Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and a 
number of the Arab Gulf states.(Hurst 2005: 75-96). The democratization plans have 
contradicted the interests of incumbent elites, along with, for different reasons, the interests 
of grassroots reformers in the region reveals not only the depth of the U.S.'s credibility 
problem but also its inability to decisively influence Arab public opinions and attitudes 
towards its plans for the region. The limitations on the administration's ability to positively 




influence the region derives, in part, from its promotion of a one-size-fits-all democratization, 
which may have underestimated the likely reactions from the leaders as well as the general 
public in the region. (Dalacoura 2005: 936).  
Consequently, while attempting to promote its geopolitical and strategic agendas in the 
region along with pursuing, in rhetoric and perhaps as a cover-up, its idealistic principles 
regarding democracy promotion, the Bush Administration found itself confronted by 
unanticipated credibility issues that have, thus far, hindered its ability to positively influence 
Arab politics at the official level in general and the Arab public stage in particular. The U.S.’s 
credibility problem was further intensified by challenges relating to the damaging 
misconducts that took place during the course of the Iraq war, notably in the aftermath of the 
Abu Ghraib scandals. While assessing the U.S.'s pursuit of conflicting and often double-
standard policies in the region, R. Aliboni and L. Guazzone stated:  
 
“… the policies to promote democracy have an idealistic background. At the same time, they 
promote substantive interests … [by which] governments happen to use the idealistic 
rational … as an ideological vehicle to pursue their real and conventional interests. This 
interplay between idealism and realism … affects those devoted to promoting democracy by 
embedding in them a tendency to practice double standards.” (R. Aliboni and L. Guazzone 
2005: 87). 
 
The depth of the credibility problem facing U.S. policy in the region, prior to and after 
the Bush Administration took office, has been rooted in contradictions found in calls 
promoting notions such as the freedom and liberty for all, which are usually identified with 
U.S. values and belief systems, while at the same time supporting Arab autocratic regimes 
and Israel’s military occupation of the Palestinian territories. (Cook: 2005: 91-102) More 
recently, the U.S. has been blamed for, namely on Arab streets, igniting the civil war in Iraq, 
supporting Israel’s recent invasion of Lebanon, and failing to end the stalemate in the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. Moderates in the Arab world also view Bush’s democracy plans in 
the region as a factor that has deeply challenged the chances of their success in pursuing 
social and political reform. In addressing the U.S.’s credibility issue and its detrimental 
effects on democracy promotion, John Calabrese stated: 
 
“Does the poor image and damaged credibility of the messenger fatally compromise the 
message? Hardly. But it does play into the hands of incumbent regimes. And it makes 
reformers somewhat wary of being tarred by association with the United States … [that] suffer 
from a credibility deficit ...” (Calabrese 2005: 60). 
 
On a personal level, Bush’s communication style has also contributed to the credibility 
issue facing his Administration in the region. For example, Bush’s reference to biblical 
concepts and generalized themes in the form of scripted speeches led not only to the 
construction of the image of Arabs as enemies of the U.S., but has also strengthened the 
appeal of anti-Americanism in the Arab world. (Merskin 2004: 157-175). Consistent with 
past U.S. policymakers, Bush’s policy advisors have also based their agenda for the greater 
Middle East on “conventional wisdoms” and frame of references, which usually favor Israeli 
interests at the expense of others in the region. (Christion 2001).
 
Obviously, a majority of 
U.S. policymakers may have consequently failed to obtain needed “true knowledge” of the 
deep complexities of the region that would be essential in the implementation of a possible 




successful agenda in the region. (Altrman 2004: 85). Misperceptions that were often 
formulated by U.S. policymakers about the Arab world have not only played an essential role 
in the subsequent launching of misguided policy recommendations, but also in that such 
policy recommendation may have proven to be unsuitable, based on the issues at hand such 
as the democracy promotion plans, for the Arab world at both the official and public levels. 
While the White House’s national security strategy continues, in part, to address 
democracy promotion and confronting extremists worldwide, the appeal of global Islamist 
Jihadies continues to rise across the region, especially in the period that followed the Iraq 
war. The concept of Jihad, especially in western sources, is usually used to refer to a holy 
war while the concept of Jihadies describes the individuals engaged in the actual fighting of 
a holy war.  For the most part, two trends of Jihadies have been thoroughly examined by 
experts and observers in recent years. The first trend is locally oriented and usually focuses 
its agenda on addressing domestic and limited nationalist objectives, such as, among others, 
the role played by the Islamic Jihad group in Egypt, the Hizbullah organization against Israel 
in South Lebanon and the Hamas movement in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The 
second trend of Jihadies is usually more radical in its tools and strategies along with being 
far more ideologically oriented towards confronting the U.S. and the West. This trend has 
succeeded in formulating what is now known as global Jihadis, notably al-Qaeda, who have 
succeeded in redirecting local Islamists’ agendas, such as in the case of the Islamic Jihad 
movement in Egypt, more in support of global Jihadism voiced by the leader of that 
movement, Ayman al-Zawahiri, against the U.S. and the West. The strength and appeal of 
global Jihadies, that became more obvious in the post-September 11th era, has largely been 
fueled by the lack of a settlement for the Palestinian issue and by the damaging effects of the 
Iraq war. (Gerges 2005: 276). Faced with global Jihadies who largely benefited from U.S. 
involvement in Iraq, it is very unlikely that the Bush Administration's democracy promotion 





Although Arab autocratic regimes remain solely responsible for the absence of 
democracy in the Arab world, the U.S.’s strategy on democracy promotion has failed to 
create the necessary changes needed to entice genuine reforms in Arab politics. The U.S. has 
also failed to convince the Arab masses that it supports their quest for freedom and liberty. In 
addition to the presence of widespread conspiracies and skepticisms about the U.S.’s 
intentions in the region, Arab incumbents have played a complacent role in obstructing the 
promotion of democratic changes, such as those initiated by the U.S., in their countries. Arab 
autocratic regimes have, directly or indirectly, portrayed Arab reformers and their supporters 
as traitors to their own nations and agents to outside powers, including Israel. (Flockhart 
2005: 53-66) While rationalizing their own incompetence to pursue successful reforms, 
which derives from domestic challenges, Arab incumbents have been able to utilize their 
conflict with Israel as a cover-up to justify the absence of democracy in their societies. 
At the external level, the U.S.’s inability to create positive reforms in Arab politics 
remains largely influenced by its unwillingness to pressure Israel to end its military 
occupation over the Palestinian territories. This situation has over the years heightened the 
credibility problem that has faced the U.S. policy in the region in general and in challenging 
the Bush Administration’s policies in particular. (Richards 2005: 33). For their part, Israeli 




politicians have, for reasons that are not significantly different from those voiced by Arab 
incumbents and U.S. policymakers, expressed criticisms and objections to democracy 
promotion plans in Arab politics on the ground that it will endanger the stability of regimes 
that have historically supported U.S. interests in the region. Israeli politicians such as 
Knesset member Natan Sharansky, who have expressed different views from most other 
Israeli analysts, agrees with Bush's rhetoric on democracy promotion as a means and a 
precondition for Israel's negotiations with the Arab world. Sharansky viewed Ariel Sharon’s 
“disengagement” plan from Gaza as a detrimental mistake in Israel's history because, for him, 
the withdrawal should have been “linked to democratic reforms,” both in the Palestinian 
territories and in the larger Arab world. Neoconservative politicians in the White House 
along with their Protestant evangelical supporters in the U.S. have also utilized the notion of 
democracy promotion in the entire Arab world as a prerequisite for any future peace 
negotiations between Israel and its neighbors.(Sharansky 2005: 5). Consistent with this view, 
former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is also among those who considered 
democratization as a factor that could serve Israel as a pretext to maintain its control over the 
West Bank. Apart from these general views that have linked democratization in Arab politics 
with political bargaining that are intended to support Israel's continued control of Palestinian 
land, however, the large majority of Israeli politicians believe that Bush’s democracy 
promotion plans were and remain generally reflective of the U.S.’s naivety of the Arab world. 
Arab and Israeli leaders alike often cite Hamas’s success in the PA’s elections as a factor that 
should alarm them and the U.S. about the risks of democratization in the Arab world. While 
reflecting on the common reactions that Israeli politicians have often expressed in relation to 
Bush's democracy promotion plans for the Arab world, Aluf Benn stated:  
 
“Israel’s foreign policy establishment treats the idea of Arab democracy with a mixture of 
scorn, disbelief and fear …. Israelis grew to accept the current Arab governance as an 
unchanging force of nature … [they] have always preferred to deal with strong men in the 
neighborhood, viewing them as pillars of stability, rather than taking unnecessary risks …”  
(Aluf 2005: 45) 
 
Few scholars, politicians and observers would say that they are optimistic about the 
potential success of democracy promotion in Arab politics. Many realist theorists and idealist 
activists argue that military might have little or no substantial influence on the behavior of 
Arab regimes or the Arab public's pursuit of democracy promotion. This shows that the Bush 
Administration's democracy plans, as expressed in the aftermath of the Iraq war, have either 
been ineffective or superfluous. Obviously, for democratization to succeed in the Arab world, 
it is essential for scholars and policymakers alike to focus more on exploring the details of 
internal Arab politics and thus understand what seems unexplainable in the Arab world. 
Furthermore, in order to improve its visibly battered public image in the Arab world, the U.S. 
must begin changing its views on the proper approach to democratization in order to fit the 
specific circumstances in different parts of the Arab world. More importantly, the U.S. must 
try, in practice, to transform its course of actions in the region, which hardly address the 
interests of the Arab public. To avoid further deterioration to its credibility, the U.S. must 
also learn from its past mistakes, including, but not limited to, the support for the Algerian 
military coup of 1991 that was launched against Islamists who had won the election (Wittes 
2004: 76).
 
Similar to the Algerian situation, the Bush Administration, once again, while 
isolating Hamas, has managed to support al-Fatah movement as the legitimate power in the 




Palestinian territories, when the facts on the ground have shown that Hamas was the winner 
of the elections. Failing to seriously address the Palestinians’ yearning for independence 
from Israel’s military occupation has ultimately hindered the US’s geo-political and strategic 
goals, along with its credibility in the region. The U.S. must also realize that failing to 
include moderate Islamists who are willing to respect the democratic process that allows 
them to win elections will transform moderate Islamists into more ideologically and 
politically hostile trends that may threaten the U.S.’s interests along with hindering the 
stability of the region. As mistrust of the U.S.’s policies and motives continue to be 
highlighted, scholarly and policy oriented debates should try to rethink the process of 
democratization in the Arab world with the U.S.’s willingness to pursue a more flexible type 
of reform across the Arab world, rather than a one-size-fits all formula. 
This article leaves open many additional factors that should be addressed in the future in 
relation to the subject of democracy in general and democracy promotion in Arab politics in 
particular. For one thing, democracy and democratic theory should be understood differently 
from how it is viewed in the U.S. and the West. For example, an Arab or a Muslim state may 
acquire certain features of democratization, that are mostly expressed in the form of guided 
democratization, in order to pursue a lengthy and more gradual process than the one 
experienced in other settings around the world. If Arab and Muslim states do indeed acquire 
this kind of mixed forms of democratic ideals and procedures, it should be clear that the 
direction of this change should be focused on maximizing public involvement in the conduct 
of policymaking. As such, democracy promotion in the Arab world is faced with a problem 
stemming, in part, from a narrow definition and understanding of democracy and 
democratization that largely fits understandings found in the U.S. and western views of 
democracy. Faced with this challenge, Arabs and Muslims continue to express real fears of 
western style democracy that might be viewed as a threat to their cultural orientations, 
religion and traditions. Of course, Arab incumbents have used the legitimate fear of their 
public as a means to satisfy their own strategic ends, which also entails a refusal to accept 
democratic values and procedures that may in due course oust them from power. The Arab 
and Muslim public must be convinced, in practice, that democracy promotion in their 
societies is not just another trick of the U.S. to manipulate their countries. The message 
should be clearly made to the general public that democracy is an important system for them, 
and those who wish to apply it will be able to influence the course of public policies in their 
societies and maximize their liberties, and oust their entrenched autocratic leaders who have, 
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